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Abstract 
This Article analyzes the transformation of Western legal philosophy in the 
sixteenth-century Lutheran Reformation, with a focus on the legal thought of theologian 
Martin Luther, moral philosopher Philip Melanchthon, and legal theorist Johann 
Oldendorp.  Starting with Luther’s two kingdoms theory, Melanchton developed an 
intricate theory of natural law based not only on the law written on the hearts of all 
persons, but also on the law rewritten in the Decalogue, whose two tables provided the 
founding principles of religious law and civil law respectively.  Building on both Luther 
and Melanchthon, Oldendorp developed an original theory of equity and equitable law 
making and law enforcement as part of a broader biblical-based theory of natural law.  
Together these writers, laid the foundations for a new legal, political, and social theory 
which dominated Lutheran Germany and Scandinavia for the next three centuries.  
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Introduction 
“Jurists are bad Christians.”2  This is one of Martin Luther’s most famous 
aphorisms about law that every German schoolboy still learns and that every pious 
Protestant still ponders when considering the legal profession.  The phrase was of a 
piece with many other derogatory comments that Luther made about jurists. “Of the 
Gospel, jurists know nothing, and therefore they are justly excluded from the circuit of 
divinity.”3 “Every jurist is an enemy of Christ.”4  “We theologians have no worse enemies 
 
1 This Article is excerpted and updated from my Law and Protesantism: The Legal Teachings of the 
Lutheran Reformation (Cambridge, 2002), chaps. 3 and 4 and is used herein with permission of the 
publisher, Cambridge University Press.   
2 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Tischreden, 6 vols. (Weimar, 1912- ), 3, No. 2809b [hereafter WA TR]; see 
also WA TR 6, No. 7029-7030.    
3 The Table Talk of Martin Luther, trans. W. Hazlitt (Philadelphia, 1848), 135. 
than jurists.”5  “There is eternal strife and war between jurists and theologians.”6  “Every 
jurist is either a good-for-nothing or a know-nothing.”7  “A jurist should not speak until he 
hears a pig fart” for only then will his words have a proper climate to be appreciated.8  
And more scatological still: “I shit on the law of the pope and of the emperor, and on the 
law of the jurists as well.”9 
Luther’s shrill comments were, in part, the fallout of his bitter struggles with the 
University of Wittenberg law faculty about teaching the same medieval canon law texts 
that he had just risked life and limb to burn and bury for good.  They were, in part, 
echoes of contests among sixteenth-century Germans about the propriety of 
supplanting German customary law with Roman law and civilian jurisprudence.10  They 
were, in part, expressions of Luther’s theological contempt for any jurist who pretended 
to extend his ken and jurisdiction into the heavenly kingdom.  They were, in part, just 
another contribution to the vats of vitriol that every generation has poured over its jurists 
and lawyers for their hair-splitting casuistry, pretentious self-indulgence, and cleverly-
cloaked theft from their clients.11 Every community at one time or other is drawn to 
Shakespeare’s call: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers!”12  
But Luther eventually made his grudging peace with the jurists of his day.  The 
reality was that Luther needed the jurists to support his theological reformation.  It was 
one thing to deconstruct the institutional framework of medieval law, politics, and society 
with a sharp and skillfully wielded theological sword.  It was quite another thing to try to 
reconstruct a new institutional framework of Protestant law, politics, and society with 
only this theological sword in hand.  Luther learned this lesson the hard way in 
witnessing the bloody Peasants' Revolt in Germany in 1525, and the growing numbers 
of radical egalitarian and antinomian experiments engineered out of his doctrines of the 
priesthood of all believers and justification by faith alone.  He came to realize that law 
was not just a necessary evil, it was an essential blessing for life in the earthly kingdom.  
Equally essential was a corps of well-trained jurists, eager and able to given institutional 
form to the best theological teachings of the Reformation. 
In this chapter, I sample the new legal teachings of two leading scholars of the 
Lutheran Reformation in Germany -- the Lutheran philosopher, Philip Melanchthon, and 
Lutheran jurist, Johann Oldendorp.  These two great legal minds, who worked largely 
 
4 WA TR 3, No. 2837, 3027. 
5 WA TR 5, No. 5663. 
6 WA TR 6, No. 7029. 
7 WA TR 5, No. 5663. 
8 Ibid.  
9 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, repr. ed., 78 vols. (Weimar, 1883-1987), 49:302 
[hereafter WA].  See further Hans Liermann, “Der unjuristische Luther,” Luther-Jahrbuch 24 (1957): 69; 
Roderich von Stintzing, Das Sprichwort ‘Juristen böse Christen’ in seinen geschichtlichen Bedeutung 
(Bonn, 1875). 
10 See Gerald Strauss, Law, Resistance and the State: The Opposition to Roman Law in Reformation 
Germany (Princeton, NJ, 1986).  
11 See, e.g., Luther’s comments on lawyers’ tricks in Triglott Concordia: The Symbolic Books of the Ev. 
Lutheran Church German-Latin-English (St. Louis, MO, 1921), 665ff. [hereafter TC]; and further Stintzing, 
Das Sprichwort and Wilfried R. Prest, ed., Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America (London, 1981).   
12 Henry the VI, Part 2, Act 4, Scene 2. 
independently, produced the most original and enduring teachings on law and politics in 
early modern Lutheranism.  They differed in accent and application, but both anchored 
their theory in a novel treatment of the natural law – “the law written on the hearts of all 
men” as St. Paul had called it in Romans 2. 
 
Martin Luther and Philip Melanchthon on Natural Law, Biblical Law, and 
Positive Law  
Wilhelm Dilthey called Melanchthon “the ethicist of the Reformation” and the 
“greatest didactic genius of the sixteenth century, [who] liberated the philosophical 
sciences from the casuistry of scholastic thought.”13  In his own time Melanchthon was 
called “the teacher of Germany” (präceptor Germaniae) -- not only because he helped 
to construct the early modern German primary school system, but also because he 
wrote with a fluidity, power, and profundity that made him a must-read in so many 
quarters.14   
Born in 1497, Melanchthon received his bachelor’s degree at the University of 
Heidelberg in 1511 and his master’s degree at the University of Tϋbingen in 1514.  In 
1518, he was appointed to the University of Wittenberg to serve as its first professor of 
Greek.   He soon joined the Lutheran cause, and became a gifted professor of theology 
as well.  In 1519 and 1520, he wrote several learned defenses of Luther against his 
opponents and a number of short popular theological pamphlets.  In 1521, he published 
his famous Common Topics of Theology (Loci communes theologicarum) the first 
systematic treatise on Protestant theology and a standard classroom text for centuries 
to come.15  During the 1520s and 1530s, Melanchthon played a leading role in the 
debates between the Lutheran reformers and their multiple Catholic and Protestant 
opponents.  He drafted the chief declaration of Lutheran theology, the Augsburg 
Confession (1530) and its Apology (1531). He prepared a number of Lutheran 
catechisms and instruction books and published more than a dozen commentaries on 
Biblical books and ancient Christian creeds as well as several revised and expanded 
editions of his Loci communes.16 
 
13 Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (Leipzig/Göttingen, 1921- ), 21:193.  
14 Karl Hartfelder, Philipp Melanchthon als Präceptor Germaniae (Berlin, 1899); Irene Dingel and Armin 
Kohlne, eds., Philipp Melanchthon: Lehrer Deutschlands, Reformator Europas (Leipzig: Evangelisches 
Verlagsanstalt, 2011).  For biography, see Martin Greschat, Philipp Melanchthon: Theologie, Pädagoge 
und Humanist (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2010); Heinz Scheible, Melanchthon: Eine 
Biographie (Munich, 1997); Robert Stupperich, Philip Melanchthon: Gelehrter und Politiker (Zϋrich, 1996); 
Wilhelm Maurer, Der Junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation, 2 vols. (Munich, 
1969). 
15 Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes Theologici (1521), translated in Wilhelm Pauck, ed., Melanchthon 
and Bucer (Philadelphia, 1969), 18-152 [hereafter LC (1521)]. 
16 The 1535, 1543, 1555, and 1558 editions of his Loci communes appear respectively in Melanchthons 
Werke, 28 vols. in G. Bretschneider, ed., Corpus Reformatorum (Brunswick, 1864), 21:81, 229, 561; 
22:47 [hereafter CR].   
In the course of all this, Melanchthon wrote a good deal about law, chiefly in the 
context of theology and of natural and moral philosophy.17  He was especially drawn to 
the study of Roman law, and to the theological and philosophical foundations of legal 
and political institutions.  He also participated in the drafting of several reformation 
ordinances for Germany and Scandanavia, and was frequently consulted on cases that 
raised intricate legal, political, and moral questions.  Through these writings and 
activities, Melanchthon had a formidable influence on the legal and theological reforms 
of marriage, education, and social welfare in Germany and Scandanavia.18  
Lutheran Premises.  Melanchthon started with Luther’s two-kingdoms 
framework,19 and its founding theological doctrines of Law and Gospel, total depravity, 
and justification by faith alone.20  God has ordained two kingdoms or realms in which 
humanity is destined to live, Luther argued, the earthly kingdom and the heavenly 
kingdom.  The earthly kingdom is the realm of creation, of natural and civil life, where a 
person operates primarily by reason and law.  The heavenly kingdom is the realm of 
redemption, of spiritual and eternal life, where a person operates primarily by faith and 
love.  These two kingdoms embrace parallel heavenly and earthly, spiritual and 
temporal forms of righteousness and justice, government and order, truth and 
knowledge.  These two kingdoms interact and depend upon each other in a variety of 
ways, not least through biblical revelation and through the faithful exercise of Christian 
vocations in the earthly kingdom.  But these two kingdoms ultimately remain distinct. 
The earthly kingdom is distorted by sin and governed by the Law.  The heavenly 
kingdom is renewed by grace and guided by the Gospel.  A Christian is a citizen of both 
kingdoms at once and invariably comes under the distinctive government of each.  As a 
heavenly citizen, the Christian remains free in his or her conscience, called to live fully 
by the light of the Word of God.  But as an earthly citizen, the Christian is bound by law, 
and called to obey the natural orders and offices that God has ordained and maintained 
for the governance of this earthly kingdom. 
 
 
17 See discussion in Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip 
Melanchthon (Cambridge, 1995) and sample texts in Guido Kisch, Melanchthons Rechts- und Soziallehre 
(Berlin, 1967), 189-287.   
18 On Melanchthon legal philosophy, see among many others, ibid.; Clemens Bauer, “Melanchthons 
Rechtslehre,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte (1951): 64; id., “Der Naturrechtsvorstellungen des 
jungeren Melanchthon,” in Festschrift fϋr Gerhard Ritter zu seinem 60. Geburtstag (Tϋbingen, 1950), 244; 
Albert Hänel, “Melanchthon die Jurist,” Zeitschrift fϋr Rechtsgeschichte 8 (1869): 249; Walter Sohm, “Die 
Soziallehren Melanchthon,” Historische Zeitschrift 115 (1916): 68; Roderich von Stintzing, Geschichte der 
deutschen Rechtwissenschaft, Erste Abtheilung (Munich/Leipzig, 1880), 287ff.; Alfred Voigt, “Die 
juristische Hermeneutik und ihr Abbild in Melanchthons Universitätsreden,” in Festgabe fϋr Ernst von 
Hippel zu seinem 70. Geburtstag (Munich, 1965), 265.  On Melanchthon’s influence on sixteenth-century 
jurists, see Stintzing, Geschichte, 241-338; Kisch, Melanchthons Rechtslehre, 51-73. 
19 See esp. TC 328-33; Philip Melanchthon, Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci Communes 1555, 
trans. and ed. Clyde L. Manschrek (New York/Oxford, 1965), 39-44, 274-279, 323-344  [hereafter LC 
(1555)]; CR 11:68ff., 357ff., 917ff. and detailed discussion in Adolf Sperl, Melanchthon zwischen 
Humanismus und Reformation (Munich, 1959).   
20 See LC (1521), 49-111; LC (1555), 83-174, with further sources and discussion in Kusukawa, Natural 
Philosophy, 27-74; Timothy J. Wengert, Philip Melanchthon’s Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of 
Rotterdam (New York/Oxford, 1998). 
These earthly authorities, Luther argued, operate first and foremost by the law of 
nature.  Luther defined this law, conventionally, as the set of norms ordained by God in 
the creation, written by God on the hearts of all persons, and rewritten by God on the 
pages of the Bible.  Luther called this variously the “law of nature,” “natural law,” “divine 
law,” “Godly law,” “the law of the heart,” “the teachings of conscience,” “the inner law,” 
among others.21  His main point was that God’s natural law set at creation continued to 
operate in the earthly kingdom after the fall into sin, and that it provided the foundation 
for all positive law and public morality in the earthly kingdom.   
 
The natural law, said Luther, defined the basic obligations that a person owed to 
God, neighbor, and self.  The clearest expression of these obligations was the Ten 
Commandments which God inscribed on two tables and gave to Moses on Mt. Sinai.  
The First Table of the Decalogue set out basic obligations to honor the Creator God, to 
respect God’s name, to observe the Sabbath, to avoid idolatry and blasphemy.  The 
Second Table set out basic obligations to respect one’s neighbor—-to honor authorities, 
and not to kill, commit adultery, steal, bear false witness, or covet.22  Luther believed 
this to be a universal statement of the natural law binding not only on the Jews of the 
Old Testament but on everyone. “The Decalogue is not the law of Moses ... but the 
Decalogue of the whole world, inscribed and engraved in the minds of all men from the 
foundation of the world.”23  “[W]hoever knows the Ten Commandments perfectly must 
know all the Scriptures, so that, in all affairs and cases, he can advise, help, comfort, 
judge, and decide both spiritual and temporal matters, and is qualified to sit in judgment 
upon all doctrines, estates, spirits, laws, and whatever else is in the world.”24  And 
again: “[A]lthough the Decalogue was given in a particular way and place and 
ceremony, ... all nations acknowledge that there are sins and iniquities.”25 
  
Knowledge of this natural law comes not only through revealed Scripture, Luther 
argued, but also through natural reason.  Luther built on St. Paul’s notion that even the 
heathen have a “law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness” to a 
natural knowledge of good and evil (Rom. 2:15).  Every rational person thus “feels” and 
“knows” the Law of God, said Luther, even if only obliquely.  The basic teaching of the 
 
21 See the collection of quotations in Hermann W. Beyer, Luther und das Recht: Gottes Gebot, 
Naturrecht, Volksgesetz in Luthers Deutung (Munich, 1935) and fuller sources from WA in J.M. Porter, 
ed., Luther - Selected Political Writings (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974).  Among numerous studies, 
see esp. Johannes Heckel, Lex Charitatis: A Juristic Disquisition on Law in the Theology of Martin Luther, 
trans. and ed. Gottfried G. Krodel (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2010); Antii Raunio, “Divine and 
Natural Law in Luther and Melanchthon,” in Virpi Mäkinen, ed., The Lutheran Reformation and the Law 
(Leiden: Brill, 2006), 21-62; W. Cargill Thompson, The Political Thought of Martin Luther (Brighton, 
Sussex, 1984); John Tonkin, The Church and the Secular Order in Reformation Thought (New York, 
1971), 37-72; F. Eward Cranz, An Essay on the Development of Luther’s Thought on Justice, Law, and 
Society (Cambridge, MA, 1959), 73-112; Joseph Binder, “Zur Hermeneutik der Rechtslehre Martin 
Luthers,” Archiv fϋr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 51 (1965): 337; John T. McNeill, “Natural Law in the 
Thought of Luther,” Church History 10 (1941): 211.  
22 See esp. LW 44:15-114; TC 581-677.  See further Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther and the Old Testament, 
trans. Eric W. and Ruth C. Gritsch (Philadelphia, 1969). 
23 WA 39/1:478. 
24 TC 573. 
25 WA 39/1:540; see also WA 18:72; 30:192.   
natural law “lives and shines in all human reason, and if people would only pay attention 
to it, what need would they have of books, teachers, or of law?  For they carry with them 
in the recesses of the heart a living book which would tell them more than enough about 
what they ought to do, judge, accept, and reject.”26  
 
But sinful persons do not, of their own accord, “pay attention” to the natural law 
written on their hearts, and rewritten in the Bible.  Thus God has called upon other 
persons and authorities in the earthly kingdom to elaborate its basic requirements.  All 
Christians, as priests to their peers, must communicate the natural law of God by word 
and by deed.  Parents must teach it to their children and dependents.  Preachers must 
preach it their congregants and catechumens.  And magistrates must elaborate and 
enforce it through their positive laws and public policies.  
 
The magistrate’s elaboration and enforcement of the natural law through positive 
law was particularly important, Luther believed, since only the magistrate holds coercive 
legal authority in the earthly kingdom.  “Natural law is a practical first principle in the 
realm of public morality,” Luther wrote; “it forbids evil and commands good.  Positive law 
is a decision that takes local conditions into account,” and “credibly” elaborates the 
general principles of the natural law into specific precepts to fit these local conditions.  
“The basis of natural law is God, who has created this light, but the basis of positive law 
is the earthly authority,” the magistrate, who represents God in this earthly kingdom.27  
The magistrate must promulgate and enforce these positive laws by combining faith, 
reason, and tradition.  He must pray to God earnestly for wisdom and instruction.  He 
must maintain “an untrammelled reason” in judging the needs of his people and the 
advice of his counsellors.28  He must consider the wisdom of the legal tradition--
particularly that of Roman law, which Luther called a form of “heathen wisdom.”29  “The 
polity and the economy” of the earthly kingdom, Luther wrote, “are subject to reason.  
Reason has first place.  There [one finds] civil laws and civil justice.”30  
 
Natural Law and Biblical Law.  Melanchthon repeated and endorsed Luther’s 
teachings on natural law many times.31 But, already in his early writings, developed in 
his first years at the University of Wittenberg, he was more explicit than Luther in 
expounding the content of this natural law.  While the Bible helped to define and 
illustrate the natural law, he argued, classical and post-biblical sources provided 
additional insights into its content.  Melanchthon ultimately identified ten principles of 
natural law that he considered to be common to classical and Christian sources: (1) to 
worship God and to honor God’s law; (2) to protect life; (3) to testify truthfully; (4) to 
marry and raise children; (5) to care for one’s relatives; (6) to harm no one in their 
person, property, or reputation; (7) to obey all those in authority; (8) to distribute and 
 
26 WA 17/2:102. 
27 WA TR 3, No. 3911; see also WA 51:211. 
28 LW 45:120-126.    
29 WA 51:242.  See also WA 12:243; WA 14:591, 714; WA 16:537; WA 30/2:557; WA 51:241.  
30 WA 40:305.  
31 MW 4:164; CR 21:116-117; CR 16:167ff. 
exchange property on fair terms; (9) to honor one’s contracts and promises; and (10) to 
oppose injustice.32   
Melanchthon also went well beyond Luther in grounding this natural law 
philosophically.  Building on Luther’s two-kingdoms theory, Melanchthon taught that 
God has implanted in all persons certain “inborn elements of knowledge” (notitiae 
nobiscum nascentes).  These he called variously a “light from above,” a “natural light,” 
“rays of divine wisdom poured into us,” “a light of the human faculty”  without which we 
could not find our way in the earthly kingdom.33  These notitiae included various 
“theoretical principles” of logic, dialectics, geometry, arithmetic, physics, and other 
sciences--that two plus two equals four, that an object thrown into the air will eventually 
come down, that the whole is bigger than any one of its parts, and the like.  These 
notitiae also include certain “practical principles” (principia practica) of ethics, politics, 
and law – that “men were born for civil society,” that offenses which harm society should 
be punished, that “promises should be kept,” and many others.34  “All these natural 
elements of knowledge,” Melanchthon believed, “are congruent with the eternal and 
unchanging norm of the divine mind that God has planted in us.”  They provide the 
starting point for life and learning in this earthly kingdom.35   
Melanchthon often equated the natural law with these “practical principles,” these 
“natural elements of knowledge concerning morals” that undergird life and law in the 
earthly kingdom.36  The ten natural law principles that he had identified early in his 
career remained in place, but he now tended to distill them into more general virtues as 
well:   
The greatest and best things in the divine mind, the creator of the human 
race, are wisdom, distinguishing honorable from shameful things, and 
justice, truth, kindness, clemency, and chastity.  God planted seeds of 
these best things in human minds, when he made us after his own image.  
And he wished the life and behavior of men to correspond to the standard 
of his own mind.  He also revealed this same wisdom and doctrine of the 
virtues with his own voice [in the Bible].   
This knowledge, divinely taught both by the light that is born in us and by 
the true divine voice, is the beginning of the laws and of the political order 
[of the earthly kingdom].  God wishes us to obey them not only for the 
sake of our needs, but more, so that we may acknowledge our creator and 
learn from this same order that this world did not arise by chance, but that 
there is both a creator who is wise, just, kind, truthful, and chaste and who 
 
32 See notes in CR 21:25-27.  See another early summary in CR 21:119-20; and in Maurer, Der junge 
Melanchthon, 2:288ff. 
33 CR 13:150, 647; CR 11:920-921; CR 21:712l see also CR 13:642ff.; CR 20:695ff., 748ff.; Dialectices 
Philippi Melanchthonis (Louvain, 1534), esp. bks. II-III; Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, 2:162ff.; Heinrich 
Bornkamm, Das Jahrhundert der Reformation: Gestalten und Kräfte (Göttingen, 1966), 69ff. 
34 CR 21:117, 398-400, 711-13; CR 11:918-919. 
35 CR 16:228.   
36 Robert Stupperich, ed., Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl, 6 vols. (Gϋtersloh, 1951), 3:208 [hereafter 
MW]. 
demands similar virtues in us. We may also learn that He is an avenger 
who punishes violations of this order.37  
Human reason, Melanchthon argued, cannot prove the existence of these natural 
law principles.38  They are facts and facets of human nature, forms of innate knowledge 
that are in the mind of God, and “placed in our mind by God” when he created us “in his 
image.”39  Moreover, they cannot be fully understood using reason alone. “Our nature is 
corrupted by original sin,” Melanchthon wrote, echoing Luther’s doctrine of total 
depravity.  “Thus the law of nature is greatly obscured.”40  The best way for a Christian 
to understand the natural law, therefore, is to turn to the Bible, though Greek philosophy 
and Roman law also remained edifying in his view.41  Among the most relevant biblical 
texts reflecting the contents of the natural law, said Melanchthon, were the Torah, the 
Beatitudes, the moral codes of Jesus and St. Paul.  These biblical moral teachings he 
variously called the “divine law,” “the law of God,” “the law of morality,” “the law of 
virtue,” “the judgment of God,” “the eternal immutable wisdom and rule of justice in God 
himself.”42   
The best single summary of biblical moral law, Melanchthon wrote, was the Ten 
Commandments which Luther had also held up.  Accordingly, the best source of 
knowledge of the content of the natural law was the Decalogue.43  “[W]hy then did God 
proclaim the Ten Commandments?” 
[First], in the wake of sin, the light in human reason was not as clear and 
bright as it had been before.... Against such blindness, God not only 
proclaimed his law on Mt. Sinai, but has sustained and maintained it since 
the time of Adam in his Church.... The other reason is that it is not enough 
that a person know that he is not to kill other innocent persons, nor rob 
others of their wives and goods.  Rather, one must know who God is and 
know that God earnestly wants us to be like him, and that he assuredly 
rages against all sins.  Therefore, he proclaims his commandments 
himself, so that we know that they are not only our thoughts but that they 
are God’s law, and that God is the judge and punisher of all sinners, and 
that our hearts may recognize God’s wrath and tremble before it.... Still 
another reason that God proclaims his law is this: human reason, without 
God’s word, soon errs and falls into doubt.  If God himself had not 
graciously proclaimed his wisdom, men would fall still further into doubt 
about what God is, who he is, about what is right and wrong, what is order 
and what is disorder.44  
 
37 CR 11:918-919. 
38 CR 21:399-400; see also CR 13:547-55; 21:116-17.     
39 Quoted in Kusukawa, Natural Philosophy, 94.  
40 MW 4:146ff.; TC 157-59; CR 21:399-402. 
41 CR 21:392.  
42 CR 21:1077; 22:201-02.  
43 CR 21:392; see also CR 12:23. 
44 CR 22:256-57; see also CR 16:70. 
The Ten Commandments presented Melanchthon with a somewhat different 
iteration of the core principles of natural law than the ten principles he had listed earlier 
in his career based on his reading of the classical sources.  The Ten Commandments, 
he stressed, are not the only valid iteration of natural law.  Classical formulations, 
particularly those of Greek philosophy and Roman law, continue to be effective.  Indeed, 
the overlap between classical and biblical teachings attests to the universality of these 
natural law norms.45  But, given their authorship by God himself on Mount Sinai, the Ten 
Commandments are the most authoritative rendering of the meaning of the natural law.   
The Ten Commandments and Positive Law.  Given their importance as a 
source and summary of the natural law, a pious Christian magistrate would do well to 
start with the Ten Commandments as the foundation of the positive law. “When you 
think about Obrigkeit, about princes or lords,” Melanchthon wrote, “picture in your mind 
a man holding in one hand the tables of the Ten Commandments and holding in the 
other a sword.  Those Ten Commandments are above all the works which he must 
protect and maintain,” using the sword if necessary.  Those Ten Commandments are 
“also the source from which all teaching and well-written laws flow and by which all 
statutes should be guided.”46    
Melanchthon took this image directly into his understanding of the nature and 
purpose of the positive law.  The Christian magistrate, he said, is to enforce and 
elaborate the natural law principles set out in the Decalogue.  His positive laws are to be 
organized and informed by the two main tables of the Decalogue.  The First Table is to 
support positive laws that govern spiritual morality, the relationship between persons 
and God.  The Second Table is to support positive laws that govern civil morality, the 
relationships between persons.  
As custodians of the First Table of the Decalogue, Melanchthon wrote, 
magistrates must pass laws against idolatry, blasphemy, and violations of the Sabbath--
offenses that the First Table prohibit on its face.47  Magistrates must also pass laws to 
“establish pure doctrine” and right liturgy, “to prohibit all wrong doctrine,” “to punish the 
obstinate,” and to root out the heathen and the heterodox.48  “[W]orldly princes and 
rulers who have abolished idolatry and false doctrine in their territories and have 
established the pure doctrine of the Gospel and the right worship of God have acted 
rightly,” Melanchthon argued.  “All rulers are obliged to do this.”49  
Melanchthon’s move toward the establishment of the Christian religion by state 
positive laws was a marked departure from Luther’s original teaching.  In 1523, for 
example, Luther had written: “Earthly government has laws that extend no further than 
to life, property, and other external things on earth.  For God cannot and will not allow 
 
45 Ibid; CR 11:66-86, 919-924.  
46 CR 22:615. 
47 CR 16:87-88; 22:615-617.  
48 CR 22:617-18.   
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anyone but himself alone to rule over the soul.  Thus when the earthly power presumes 
to prescribe laws to souls, it encroaches upon God and his government and only 
seduces and corrupts souls.”50  Luther eventually softened this stance, particularly in his 
late-life railings against Jews, Antinomians, and Anabaptists.51  But he remained firmly 
opposed to the magistrate defining by positive law what Christian doctrines and liturgies 
were orthodox, what heterodox.   
Melanchthon had held similar views in the 1520s and 1530s.  But he eventually 
retreated from this position, despite Luther’s objections that he was thereby betraying 
the essence of the Lutheran two-kingdoms theory.52  Melanchthon, even more than 
Luther in his later life, had been party to two decades of intense religious rivalries 
between and among Catholics and Protestants in Germany.  He had become 
increasingly dismayed at the fracturing of German society and the perennial outbreaks 
of violent antinomianism and spiritual radicalism.  He had become especially incensed 
at the “great many frantic and bewildered souls” who were blaspheming God and His 
law with their “monstrous absurdities” and “diabolical rages.”53  To allow such 
blasphemy and chaos to continue without rejoinder, Melanchthon believed, was 
ultimately to betray God and to belie the essence of the political office.  After all, he 
reasoned, “earthly authority is obliged to maintain external discipline according to all the 
commandments.  External idolatry, blasphemy, false oaths, untrue doctrine, and heresy 
are contrary to the First Table [of the Decalogue].  For this reason, earthly authority is 
obliged to prohibit, abolish, and punish these depravities [and] to accept the Holy 
Gospel, to believe, confess, and direct others to true divine service.”  The political office 
“before all else should serve God, and should regulate and direct everything to the glory 
of God.”54 
With this teaching, Melanchthon helped to lay the theoretical basis for the welter 
of new religious establishment laws that were promulgated in Lutheran cities and 
territories, many of which contained comprehensive compendia of orthodox Lutheran 
confessions and doctrines, songs and prayers, and liturgies and rites.  The principle of 
cuius regio eius religio (“whoseever region, his religion”) set forth in the Religious Peace 
of Augsburg (1555) and expanded in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), rested ultimately 
on Melanchthon’s theory that the magistrate’s positive law was to use the First Table of 
the Decalogue to establish for his people proper Christian doctrine, liturgy, and spiritual 
morality. 
As custodians of the Second Table of the Decalogue, Melanchthon argued, 
magistrates are called to govern “the multiple relationships by which God has bound 
men together.”55  Melanchthon listed a whole series of positive laws that properly belong 
under each of the Commandments of the Second Table.  On the basis of the Fourth 
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Commandment (“Honor thy father and mother”), magistrates are obligated to prohibit 
and punish disobedience, disrespect, or disdain of authorities such as parents, political 
rulers, teachers, employers, masters, and others.  On the basis of the Fifth 
Commandment (“Thou shalt not kill”), they are to punish unlawful killing, violence, 
assault, battery, wrath, hatred, merciliness, and other offenses against neighbors.  On 
the basis of the Sixth Commandment (“Thou shalt not commit adultery”), they are to 
prohibit adultery, fornication, inchastity, incontinence, prostitution, pornography, 
obscenity, and other sexual offenses.  On the basis of the Seventh Commandment 
(“Thou shalt not steal”), they are to outlaw theft, burglary, embezzlement, and similar 
offenses against another’s property, as well as waste or noxious use or sumptuous use 
of one’s own property.  On the basis of the Eighth Commandment (“Thou shalt not bear 
false witness”), they are to punish all forms of perjury, dishonesty, fraud, defamation, 
and other violations of a person’s reputation or status in the community.  Finally, on the 
basis of the Ninth and Tenth Commandments (“Thou shalt not covet”), they are to 
punish all attempts to perform these or other offensive acts against another’s person, 
property, reputation, or relationships.56  
Many of these aspects of social intercourse had traditionally been governed by 
the Church’s canon law and organized in part by the seven sacraments.  The sacrament 
of marriage, for example, supported the positive law of sex, marriage, and family life.  
The sacrament of penance supported the canon law of crimes against the persons, 
properties, and reputations of others.  The sacraments of baptism and confirmation 
undergirded a constitutional law of natural rights and duties of Christian believers.  The 
sacrament of holy orders supported the law of the clergy.  The sacrament of extreme 
unction supported the positive laws of burial, inheritance, foundations, and trusts.57  
Melanchthon used the Ten Commandments, instead of the seven sacraments, to 
organize the various systems of positive law.  And he looked to the state, instead of the 
church, to promulgate and enforce these positive laws on the basis of the Ten 
Commandments and biblical and extrabiblical sources of natural law and morality.  
Melanchthon’s argument provided a further rationale, beyond Luther’s, to support the 
abrupt transfer of legal power from the church to the state upon the burning of the 
canon law books.58  The magistrate was God’s vice-regent called to enforce God’s law 
in the earthly kingdom through positive laws.  God’s law was most clearly summarized 
in the Ten Commandments.  The magistrate therefore had to pass positive laws for 
each of these Commandments, reforming the ius commune in light of the new Lutheran 
teachings.   
In criminal law, Melanchthon urged magistrates to develop comprehensive codes 
of criminal law that defined and prohibited all manner of offense against the person, 
property, reputation, or relationships of another and to enforce these laws “swiftly and 
severely.”  He described three main purposes of criminal law and punishment.  First, 
criminal law and punishment served the goal of deterrence, both special deterrence of 
the individual defendant and general deterrence of the broader community who witness 
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his punishment.  “When some are punished, others are reminded to take account of 
God’s wrath and to fear his punishment and thus to reduce the causes of punishment.”   
Second, criminal law and punishment served the goal of retribution.  “God is a wise and 
righteous being, who out of his great and proper goodness created rational creatures to 
be like him,” Melanchthon wrote.  “Therefore, if they strive against him the order of 
justice [requires that] he destroy them.”  The magistrate, as God’s vice-regent, was 
called to effectuate this divine end by defining the meaning of God’s law through 
criminal laws, and punishing those who violated the same.  Third, criminal punishment 
served the goal of rehabilitation -- of allowing a person to learn again how to “distinguish 
between virtue and vice,” and so come to better and fuller understanding of God’s law, 
order, and justice.59   
Melanchthon’s theory of the three purposes of criminal law was part and product 
of his theology of “the three uses of natural law.”  Luther, Melanchthon, and other early 
Protestants had developed this usus legis doctrine to explain why the law of God and 
nature was still "useful” in the life of the earthly kingdom, even if justification and 
salvation came only through faith in God’s grace.  The natural law, Melanchthon argued, 
had three uses – a civil use of restraining sin, a theological use of encouraging 
contrition, and an educational use of learning good works, even if they could never be 
done perfectly enough to warrant salvation.60 
The deterrent function of the criminal law ran closely parallel to the civil use of 
the natural law.  Melanchthon, the theologian, stressed the "wrath of God against all 
unrighteousness" which coerced persons not to follow their natural inclination to sin.  He 
adduced ample biblical examples of the ill plight of the sinner to drive home his point.  
Melanchthon, the jurist, stressed the severity of the magistrate against all uncivil 
conduct.  He pointed to many examples of the law's harsh public sanctions against 
criminals to deter persons from all such uncivil conduct.  The retributive function of the 
criminal law ran closely parallel to the theological use of the natural law, though the 
emphases were different.  Melanchthon, the theologian, emphasized the need to 
avenge violations of the natural law and to impel a sinner to seek grace.  Melanchthon, 
the jurist, emphasized the need for the community to participate in such avenging of its 
law and emphasized the responsibility of the magistrate to induce the sinner to seek 
forgiveness from God, the state, and the victim at once. The rehabilitative function of the 
criminal law ran closely parallel to the educational use of the natural law, though here, 
too, the emphases were different.  Melanchthon, the theologian, emphasized the need 
for moral reeducation of justified believers alone.  Melanchthon, the jurist, emphasized 
the need for moral reeducation of all persons, especially those convicted criminals who 
had not yet been justified.  This blending of the uses of natural law and the purposes of 
criminal law was an important bridge between theology and law in the Lutheran 
Reformation.61   
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In civil law, as opposed to criminal law, Melanchthon postulated the duty of the 
ruler to facilitate and regulate the formation and function of various types of voluntary 
social relationships or associations.  He focused on three such relationships, those of 
(1) private contract, (2) marriage and the family, and (3) the visible church.  
“God has ordained contracts of various kinds,” Melanchthon wrote.62  These 
include contracts of sale, lease, exchange of property, procurement of labor and 
employment, lending of money, extension of credit, and more.63  All such contracts 
serve not only the utilitarian ends of exchanging goods and services but also the social 
ends of promoting equality and checking greed.64 Accordingly, God has called the 
magistrate to promulgate general contract laws that prescribe “fair, equal, and 
equitable” agreements, that invalidate contracts based on fraud, duress, mistake, or 
coercion, and that proscribe contracts that are unconscionable, immoral, or offensive to 
the public good. Melanchthon was largely content to state these general principles of 
contract law in categorical form, although he occasionally applied them to specific 
cases.  For example, he condemned with particular vehemence loan contracts that 
obligated debtors to pay usurious rates of interest-—a subject on which Luther had also 
written at length, and which would become a regular feature of Protestant ethics and 
legal theory.65  He also condemned contracts or mortgages that entitled creditors to 
secure a loan with property whose value far exceeded the amount of the loan, unilateral 
labor and employment contracts that conditioned a master’s obligation to pay anything 
on full performance from the servant, and contracts of purchase and sale that were 
based on inequality of exchange.66  Such moral teachings on contract were quite 
consistent with prevailing teachings of the ius commune.67  Melanchthon’s articulation of 
them, however, was an important impetus for the transplantation and implementation of 
them in the new Protestant civil law of obligations.68   
Christian magistrates were also to promulgate positive laws  to govern marriage 
and family relations.  These laws must prescribe monogamous heterosexual marriages 
between two fit parties and to proscribe homosexual, polygamous, and other “unnatural” 
relations.  They must ensure that each marriage is formed by voluntary consent of both 
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parties and undo relationships based on fraud, mistake, coercion, or duress.  They must 
promote the created marital functions of procreation and childrearing and prohibit all 
forms of contraception, abortion, and infanticide.  They must protect the authority of the 
paterfamilias over his wife and children but punish severely all forms of adultery, 
desertion, incest, and wife or child abuse, especially by that paterfamilias.  These 
teachings, together with those of Luther and other reformers, would have a formidable 
influence on the reformation of marriage law.69   
Finally, Christian magistrates were to regulate the visible church by positive laws.  
These “ecclesiatical laws” were to govern not only doctrine, liturgy, and Sabbath 
observance, according to the First Table of the Decalogue, but also church polity and 
property, according to the general principles of the Second Table of the Decalogue.  
“The prince is God’s chief bishop (summus episcopus) in the church,” Melanchthon 
wrote.70  He is to define the hierarchical polity of the church--from local congregations to 
urban ecclesiastical circuits to the territorial council or synod.  He is to decide the 
responsibilities and procedures of congregational consistories, of circuit councils, and of 
the territorial synod.  He is to appoint ecclesiastical officials, to pay them, to supervise 
them, and, if necessary, to admonish and discipline them.  He is to ensure that the local 
universities and schools produce the pastors, teachers, and administrators needed to 
operate the church.  He is to furnish the land, the supplies, and the services necessary 
to erect and maintain each church building.  He is to oversee the acquisition, use, 
maintenance, and alienation of church property.71  He is to send out his superintendents 
to ensure faithful compliance of the local church both with the Gospel of Christ and the 
law of the magistrate.  Melanchthon subjected the local visible church both to the rule 
and to the protection of the local magistrate. 
Melanchthon described the duties not only of political officials but also of political 
subjects, that is, those who were subject to the magistrate’s authority and law.  Early in 
his career, Melanchthon, like Luther, taught that all subjects have the duty to obey and 
no right to resist political authority and positive law -- even where such authority and law 
has become arbitrary and abusive.  If the “magistrate commands anything with 
tyrannical caprice,” he wrote in 1521, “we must bear with this magistrate because of 
love, where nothing can be changed without a public uprising or sedition.”72  
Melanchthon based this theory of absolute civil obedience on various biblical texts 
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especially Romans 13 -- that “the powers that be are ordained by God,” that unswerving 
obedience to them is “mandated by conscience,” and that to defy them is to defy God 
and to incur God’s wrath.73  
As the power of German princes continued to grow, however, Melanchthon 
became deeply concerned to safeguard subjects from abuse and to restrain princes 
from tyranny.  At least by 1550, he joined those who recognized a right of resistance 
against tyrants based on natural law – including the authors of the famous Magdeburg 
Confession.74  “Conscious disobedience of the secular Obrigkeit and against true and 
proper laws,” he still maintained, “is deadly sin, that is, sin which God punishes with 
eternal damnation if one in conscious defiance finally persists in it.”75   However, if the 
positive law promulgated by the political official contradicts natural law, particularly the 
Ten Commandments, it is not binding in conscience and must be disobeyed.  This was 
traditional medieval lore.  It had radically different implications, however, in a unitary 
Protestant state in which there were no longer concurrent ecclesiastical and civil 
jurisdictions to challenge each other’s legislation on the ground of violation of natural 
law.  It was now left to the people--acting individually or collectively through territorial 
and imperial diets--to resist officials who had strayed beyond the authority of their office 
and to disobey laws that had defied the precepts of natural law. 
Philip Melanchthon defined a good deal of the content and the character of 
Lutheran theories of law, politics, and society.  A whole generation of Germany’s 
leading jurists in the sixteenth century came under his direct influence as students, 
colleagues, and correspondents.76  Generations of students thereafter studied his legal, 
political, and moral writings, many of which were still being printed two centuries later 
and used as textbooks in universities throughout Germany and well beyond.77  One of 
these readers was the Lutheran jurist, Johann Oldendorp. 
Johann Oldendorp on Law and Equity  
Oldendorp was described in his day as "the one person for whom the maxim 'a 
jurist is a bad Christian' could never apply."78  He was a man of extraordinary piety and 
erudition, famous throughout Germany and beyond for his Christian humanity and legal 
 
73 Ibid.   
74 For detailed sources and discussion, see my The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human 
Rights in Early Modern Calvinism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 102-22; id., Rechte, 
Widerstand und Revolution in westlicher Tradition: Frühe protestantische Grundlagen,” Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung: Kanonisches Abteilung 127 (2010): 1485. 
75 CR 22:613.  
76 See Karl Köhler, Luther und die Juristen: Zur Frage nach dem gegenseitigen Verhältnis des Rechtes 
und der Sittlichkeit (Gotha, 1873), 125ff.; Guido Kisch, “Melanchthon und die Juristen seiner Zeit,” 
Mélanges Philippe Meylan (Paris, 1963), 2:135 and the detailed index in Heinz Scheible, ed., 
Melanchthons Briefwechsel, 10 vols. (Stuttgart, 1977-1987). 
77 See the editorial comments at the head of each of his works in CR on Melanchthon’s writings.  See 
details on some of the main jurists’ writings in Gisela Becker, Deutsche Juristen und ihre Schriften auf 
den römischen Indices des 16. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1970). 
78 Jacob Spiegel, Lexicon iuris civilis (Basel, 1554), col. 210, quoted by Friederich Merzbacher, "Johann 
Oldendorp und das kanonischen Recht," in Siegfried Grundmann, ed., Fϋr Kirche und Recht: Festschrift 
fϋr Joh. Heckel (Cologne, 1959), 223n. 
learning.  Ernst Troeltsch and Roderich von Stintzing both called him “the most 
influential jurist” of the Reformation era.79  He was also one of the most prolific, the 
author of at least 56 separate volumes on law.  Eight volumes were decidedly 
jurisprudential, treating concepts of law and equity, authority and liberty, justice and 
judgment.  Most of his other volumes dealt with legal issues of property, inheritance, 
civil procedure, domestic relations, statutory interpretation, and conflict of laws.  He also 
published commentaries on several Roman law texts, an encyclopedic legal dictionary, 
and several famous student handbooks and textbooks.80     
Oldendorp was born in Hamburg about 1486.  He studied civil law and canon law 
at the Universities of Rostock and Bologna.  In 1516 he became a professor of Roman 
law and civil procedure at the University of Greifswald.  In his early years, he was 
steeped in legal humanism, with a particular interest in the styles of legal advocacy and 
judgment, and in the techniques of resolving conflicts between and among canon laws 
and civil laws.81  In the course of the early 1520s, Oldendorp was slowly drawn to the 
Lutheran cause.  In 1526, he resolved to support the Reformation.  He left Greifswald to 
become a city official (Stadtsyndicus) of Rostock, and he soon became a leader of the 
city’s reformation party.  He helped to draft the city’s new reformation ordinance of 
1530.82  He also served as a superintendent for the new Lutheran churches, involving 
himself in the reforms of preaching, liturgy, and church polity, in the reorganization of 
church properties, and in the creation of a new Lutheran public school and almshouse.  
While in Rostock, Oldendorp also published two texts that outlined several main themes 
of his legal theory–-What is Equitable and Right (1529) and A Statesman’s Mirror on 
Good Policy (1530).83   
In 1534, the city council of Rostock retreated from the Reformation, and 
Oldendorp was forced to leave.  He moved to Lϋbeck, an important commercial center 
that had just promulgated two lengthy reformation ordinances for the city and 
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surrounding rural areas.84  There, too, Oldendorp served as Stadtsyndikus and 
superintendent for the new Lutheran churches.  But there, too, Catholic opposition 
eventually forced him to leave.  From 1536 to 1543, Oldendorp moved back and forth 
among the universities of Frankfurt an der Oder, Cologne, and Marburg, changing 
venues as local leaders in Frankfurt and Cologne changed their minds about 
Protestantism.  Despite his itinerancy, he published a dozen volumes in this period, 
including A Methodology of Natural, Common, and Civil Law (1539), Principles of the 
Decalogue (1539), and A Legal Disputation on Law and Equity (1541).85  
In 1539, Oldendorp came into personal contact with Melanchthon--a Christian 
theologian and philosopher of “the highest erudition,” as he later called him.86  
Oldendorp was particularly taken with Melanchthon’s topical method of systematic 
theology set out in his Loci communes theologicarum (1521).  He dedicated one of his 
next works to Melanchthon,87 and shortly thereafter published his own new legal 
synthesis, aptly titled Loci communes iuris civilis.88   
In 1543, Oldendorp returned for good to the University of Marburg, where the 
Reformation had become firmly established, and he remained on the law faculty until his 
death in 1567.  He accepted the call to Marburg on condition that he be freed from the 
usual requirement of lecturing on the Roman law texts and their medieval glosses.89  He 
would come, he insisted, only if he could “teach the laws with special attention to their 
just consequences and to their relationship to God’s Word.”  “The study of law is the 
most important pursuit after God’s Word,” Oldendorp wrote.  Accordingly, the study of 
law “should be organized not only in light of the Word, but in accordance with it in deed; 
the Word of God must be its starting point and its guide.”90 
Oldendorp took this maxim to heart both in teaching his courses and in devising 
his theory of law and equity.  His textbooks and formal writings on legal philosophy are 
a dense blend of insights drawn from classic Greek and Roman jurists and 
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philosophers, medieval civilians and canonists, and the new Lutheran theologians and 
jurists of his day.  But it was the Bible, and conscientious meditation on the same, that 
provided the lynch pin for his theory of the sources of law and of the relationship 
between law and equity.   
Sources of Law. Oldendorp’s account of the sources of law effectively merged 
the overlapping hierarchies elaborated by the civil lawyers and canon lawyers of his 
day.  Civil lawyers, building on various texts in Justinians’ Corpus Iuris Civilis, generally 
distinguished among: (1) natural law (ius naturale), the set of immutable principles of 
reason and conscience, which are supreme in authority and divinity; (2) the law of 
nations (ius gentium), a relatively stable set of principles and customs common to 
several communities and often the basis for treaties and other diplomatic conventions; 
and (3) civil law (ius civile), both the statutes and the customs of political communities, 
whether imperial, royal, territorial, urban, manorial, feudal, or more local in character.  
Canon lawyers sometimes repeated this Roman law taxonomy.  But, building especially 
on Gratian’s Decretum (c. 1140), they also developed their own hierarchy of: (1) divine 
law (ius divinum), principally the norms of the Bible as interpreted by the Church and the 
Christian tradition; (2) natural law, the set of norms known through reason or intuition, 
and generally common among all peoples; and (3) civil law, the customs and statutes of 
local political communities.91  Some canonists and philosophers superimposed on this 
trilogy a category of eternal law (lex aeterna), understood as the created order and 
wisdom of God himself, which stands prior to and above the biblical revelation of divine 
law.  Other canonists interposed a category of canon law (ius canonicum), understood 
as a separate source of positive law that elaborates and illustrates the norms of divine 
and natural law and that corrects and guides the provisions of civil law.  In this fuller 
iteration of the sources of law, the late medieval canonists thus distinguished: (1) 
eternal law; (2) divine law; (3) natural law; (4) canon law; and (5) civil law.  
Oldendorp was conversant with these traditional accounts of the sources of law, 
and he rehearsed them sympathetically and repeatedly in his student textbooks and 
handbooks.  In formulating his own hierarchy, however, Oldendorp focused on three 
sources or states of law: divine law, natural law, and civil law, each of which he defined 
in his own way.   
Divine Law.  The highest source and state of law was divine law (ius divina), 
which for Oldendorp consisted exclusively of the laws of the Bible (leges Bibliae).  
Biblical laws were of three types, Oldendorp argued, following theological conventions.  
The moral laws of the Bible, particularly the Ten Commandments, were universal norms 
binding on all authorities and all subjects at all times.  The juridical laws of the Bible 
(such as the Old Testament laws of tithing and sanctuary or the New Testament stories 
of ordering life in the apostolic church) were probative of the meaning of the moral law, 
and useful for the governance of contemporary churches and states, but they were not 
per se binding.  The ceremonial laws of the Torah (Old Testament laws respecting 
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sacrifice, diet, ritual, temple life) were preempted by the new teachings of Christ and the 
apostles, and were no longer binding on anyone.92   
Contrary to some traditional teachings, Oldendorp had little place in his system 
for an eternal law of the created order that stood prior to and superior to the divine law 
revealed in the Bible.  To be sure, said Oldendorp, the creation order came prior to the 
Bible, and was indeed a perfect expression of God’s being, will, and law in Paradise.93  
But though prior in time and perfect in genesis, the eternal law was no longer superior in 
authority as a source of law for life in the earthly kingdom.  For with the fall into sin, the 
norms of the created order can be read “only through a glass darkly,” leading to 
inevitable distortion and deception.  Thus as a source of law for this earthly life, the 
eternal law of nature has effectively collapsed into the natural law of human nature.  It is 
a useful, but ultimately a fallible, guide to proper human living.94  Citing the reformers’ 
doctrine of sola Scriptura, Oldendorp wrote: “What we know of God, his will, his law, his 
wisdom, his purposes, his being is most fully revealed in the Bible.”95  The laws of the 
Bible, particularly its moral commandments and counsels, are the clearest and most 
authoritative source of law in this world.   
Oldendorp believed that the magistrate is the “vicar of God” directly called to 
interpret, apply, and enforce these biblical laws in the earthly kingdom.96  Oldendorp 
considered the moral laws of the Bible to be the divine legal principles needed to guide 
various systems of positive law.  Building on but revising Melanchthon’s formulations, 
he traced public or constitutional laws for governing the earthly kingdom to the 
principles of the Fourth Commandment (“Honor thy father and thy mother,” the 
magistrate being the “father of the community”).  He traced the ecclesiastical laws of the 
visible church to the first Three Commandments on idolatry, false swearing, and 
Sabbath Day observance.  He traced criminal laws to the principles of the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Commandments (“Thou shalt not kill, steal, or commit adultery”), the 
private law of property and contracts to the principles of the Seventh Commandment 
(“Thou shalt not steal”), the laws of procedure and evidence to the principles of the 
Eighth Commandment (“Thou shalt not bear false witness”), and family law to the 
principles of the Fourth and Sixth Commandments as well as the Tenth Commandment 
(“Thou shalt not covet ... thy neighbor’s wife”).  He traced the laws of taxation and social 
welfare to the general summary of the law (“Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”).97   
Natural Law.  Though superior in clarity and authority, the divine law did not 
eclipse the natural law (ius naturale), Oldendorp argued.  Natural law for Oldendorp was 
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the law of the human heart or conscience.  Oldendorp called this variously the “law 
inside people” (lex in hominibus), the “law inscribed” on the heart (ius insculpta), and the 
“instruction of conscience” (instructio conscientiae).98  Following Melanchthon, 
Oldendorp believed that “God has implanted in us natural elements (notitiae) of 
knowledge by which we distinguish equity from iniquity.”99  “The source of [these] 
natural norms ... is the heart and conscience of man, on which God has inscribed 
them.”100  Even independent of their knowledge of the divine law of the Bible, all 
persons are thus by nature inclined toward the general moral principles taught by the 
Bible--love of God, neighbor, and self, love for one’s spouse, child, and kin, love of 
peace, order, and stability, a predisposition toward the golden rule, an inclination to 
speak the truth, to honor one’s promises, to respect another’s person, property, and 
reputation.101  Many of these natural norms were thus held in common among all 
peoples of the world, regardless of their direct access to biblical law.  They formed a 
common law, or law of nations (ius gentium).  
The teachings of natural law and biblical law are ultimately the same, Oldendorp 
believed.  But "the natural elements of knowledge in persons have been obscured 
because of original sin."  Thus "a merciful God has restored and inscribed them on 
tables of stone so that there would be a sure testimony that these laws of nature are 
confirmed by the word of God, which he has also inscribed on the souls of men.”102  
Neither the biblical law nor the natural law, however, provide a comprehensive code of 
human conduct that covers every contingency of human action and interaction.  
Accordingly, the moral laws of the Bible had given rise to various forms of juridicial and 
ceremonial laws that were specific to the biblical time and place of the Hebrew people.  
Likewise, the moral principles of natural law must give rise to multiple forms of statutory 
and customary laws that are specific to the current time and place of the German 
people.  In biblical times, God often directly guided the elaboration and application of 
moral law--through his personal interventions in Paradise and on Mt. Sinai and through 
the later teachings of Moses and the prophets, of Christ and the apostles.  In our times, 
God’s guidance in the application and elaboration of moral principles comes less 
personally but more pervasively–-through the perennial teachings of every human 
conscience on which God has inscribed his natural law.103   
Conscience, for Oldendorp, was a form of reason.  It was not just ordinary human 
reason or civil reason (ratio civilis).  It was a God-given reason or natural reason (ratio 
naturalis).  Thus the natural law implanted by God in human conscience “does not 
depend on the power of the person but stands free, unchangeable.  God has written it 
into your reason.  Therefore you must apply your unbiased mind and read [its teachings] 
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diligently.”104  When consulted and followed in its purest form, “conscience is an 
infallible guide.”105  To be sure, Oldendorp acknowledged, no sinful person is fully 
capable of an unbiased consultation of his or her conscience.  Hence there is a 
perennial need for the Bible, for prayer, for the intervention of the Holy Spirit to come to 
better understanding of God’s law.  But, even independent of invocation of these 
spiritual aids, the God-given conscience provides ample instruction on the meaning and 
measure of the natural law.106  In effect, conscience was, for Oldendorp, a form of 
practical reason. 
Civil Law.  Civil law (ius civile) consists simply of all the laws of a commonwealth 
or republic (leges rei publicae).  “In its ultimate sense," Oldendorp wrote capaciously, 
"the category of law" consists of all legal norms that command, prohibit, permit, or 
punish human conduct.107  Such legal norms may be written or unwritten, general or 
particular, universal or local, positive or customary, public or private, criminal or civil, 
legislative or judicial.108  All these, in their own way, are legitimate forms and norms of 
civil law, Oldendorp believed.  A dialectical presentation of these laws–-a taxonomy that 
presses them into ever more refined sets of binary opposites--is the best way for 
students and practitioners to come to terms with the category of law.  In his legal 
textbooks, handbooks, and dictionary, Oldendorp spelled out these contrasts in great 
detail, grounded them in the writings of medieval canonists and civilians, and 
demonstrated their utility for legal advocacy and decision-making.  Such dialectical legal 
writing was of a piece with that of many other Protestant jurists in the sixteenth century-
–Konrad Lagus and Christoph Hegendorf of Wittenberg, Francis Duaren and Francis 
Hotman of France, Nicolaus Everardus and Johannes Althusius of the Netherlands, and 
many others who worked under the direct inspiration of Protestant theology and 
theologians.109  
All such civil laws, Oldendorp insisted, depend for their authority and legitimacy 
on their conformity with natural law and ultimately with divine law.  “A civil law that 
departs in toto" from these higher laws "is not binding," Oldendorp insisted.110  He listed 
a number of civil laws of his day that he considered to be per se illegitimate.  He 
condemned, as directly contrary to divine law, human laws permitting the sale of church 
benefices, allowing for divorce and remarriage, and tolerating usurious rates of interest 
on loans.  He condemned, as contrary to natural law, human laws permitting bad faith 
possession of property, allowing disinheritance of family members, causing undue delay 
in administering justice, rendering judgment in a case in which one has an interest, and 
instituting slavery and other strict forms of servitude.111  More generally, he argued that 
natural law requires an owner to use private property for social ends and not, for 
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example, to exclude others from use of it in instances where such use does the owner 
no harm.112  
It was the magistrate's duty to institute "good policy" through the promulgation 
and enforcement of positive civil laws.113  Much of what Oldendorp considered to be 
“good policy” in a Christian commonwealth was rather conventional.  But he described 
this in the Lutheran language of the “civil, theological, and educational uses” of law 
which enable us to “peacefully pass through this shadowy life and be led to Christ and 
to eternal life.”114  With Melanchthon, he emphasized the “educational use” of the law, 
“our teacher in the path to Christ” (pädagogus noster ad Christum), and the 
corresponding paternal and pedagogical role of the magistrate, the “father of the 
community.”115  Moreover, specific to his Lutheran sympathies, Oldendorp insisted that 
the magistrate must support the true faith by seeing to it (among other things) that there 
are enough well-qualified and well-paid preachers, so that they may “combat unbelief 
among the people.”116  The magistrate must also prohibit and punish acts of greed, 
idleness, sumptuousness of dress, and other immoral conduct that had traditionally 
been within the jurisdiction of the Church.117  And the magistrate must institute and 
support good public schools and public charities–-policies that Oldendorp had himself 
pursued in Rostock and Lϋbeck, and which other reformers pressed relentlessly.118 
The magistrate must also seek to maintain peace with other civil polities.  Despite 
the divisions born of the Reformation, Oldendorp argued, the people of all republics still 
form the body of Christ on earth (corpus Christianum) and should live “next to each 
other, not against each other.”119  War is justified only for defense against an unjust 
attack.  Even when attacked, Oldendorp wrote, a civil polity should seek to settle the 
conflict peaceably.  If that proves impossible, a polity should leave three days before 
defending itself in order to give the imminent attackers a chance to change their minds–
-a rather startling, some might say suicidal, application of the biblical principle of “turning 
the other cheek.”  Moreover, defense should be limited to that which is necessary, 
because its only purpose is to restore peace.120 
It was also the magistrate's duty to abide by the law--not only the divine and 
natural laws that empowered his office, but also the civil laws that he and his 
predecessors promulgated. “It is an old question,” Oldendorp wrote, “whether the 
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magistrates are superior to the law or whether the law binds the magistrates.”  His 
answer was that “the magistrates are ministers, that is, servants of the laws.”121  “It is 
false and simplistic,” he wrote, “to assert that the prince has power to go against the 
law.  For it is proper to such majesty ... to serve the laws"--whether divine, natural, or 
civil.122 
Theory of Equity.  There remained, for Oldendorp, a crucial question that 
neither Luther nor Melanchthon had adequately addressed, namely, by what criteria are 
legal norms, whether biblical, natural, or civil, to be applied in individual cases?  The 
very generality of a legal norm or rule, Oldendorp wrote, presupposes that it is 
applicable in a wide variety of different situations, each with its own unique 
circumstances.  Yet the rule itself contains no indication of how the multiplicity of 
differences are to be taken into account.  Two centuries after Oldendorp, Immanuel 
Kant expressed this point succinctly in his dictum that “there is no rule for applying a 
rule.”123 
Luther had spoken cryptically but provocatively to the issue. “The strictest law 
[can do] the greatest wrong,” he wrote, citing Cicero.  Thus “equity is necessary” in the 
application of rules of all sorts, whether in the state or the church, in the household or 
the classroom.124  Any ruler, whatever his office, “who does not know how to dissemble 
does not know how to rule,” Luther said pithily. “This is what is meant by [doing] equity 
(epiekeia).”125  To apply a rule equitably, Luther insisted “is not rashly to relax laws and 
discipline.”  It is rather to balance firmness and fairness and to recognize circumstances 
that might mitigate against literal application of the rule or that might raise questions that 
the rule does not and perhaps should not reach.  In such instances, “equity will weigh 
for or against” strict application of the rule, and a wise ruler will know the juster course.  
“But the weighing must be of such kind that the law is not undermined, for no 
undermining of natural law and divine law must be allowed.”126  
Melanchthon had addressed the problem at greater length, but had largely 
followed the teachings of Aristotle127 and the Roman law, and the ample medieval 
glosses and elaborations on the same.128  Rulers were required, he wrote, to “tailor” the 
general principles of natural law “to fit the circumstances.”129  If a “generally just law 
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works injustice in a particular case,” it is the responsibility of a judge to apply the law as 
“equitably and benevolently,” as possible, so as to mitigate or to remove the injustice.130  
But a “generally just law” must be maintained even if in a particular case it results in 
injustice, for “pious persons may not be left in uncertainty” about the requirements of the 
law.131  Even the highest judges, Melanchthon insisted, “must decide cases according to 
the law that is written.  Otherwise what use would it be to enact laws, if judges were 
allowed to invent equities out of their heads just like spiders spin webs.”132  
Oldendorp took a very different approach by insisting that every application of a 
legal rule required a judge to apply equity (Billigkeit, aequitas, epiekeia).  Luther and 
Melanchthon, following tradition, had contrasted equity with strict law.  Equity, they 
believed, corrected defects in a strict rule or its application.  But equity was for the 
exceptional case.  To use it indiscriminately, they believed, would erode the rule of law--
of both natural law and civil law.  Oldendorp contrasted equity with all law, not just strict 
law.  Every law, he believed, was a strict law, because every law by its nature is general 
and abstract.133  No law-maker can anticipate perfectly the circumstances in which the 
rule will be applied.  Thus every application of every rule has to be governed by equity.  
For Oldendorp, therefore, equity is to be used in every case.  And not to use it would 
erode the rule of law.  In Oldendorp’s formulation, law and equity, Recht und Billigkeit, 
ius et aequitas stood opposite each other and completed each other, becoming a single 
thing.134  
Equity, for Oldendorp, was the capacity or faculty of a judge to make a reasoned 
and conscientious judgment in each particular case.  Equity was an exercise of both 
civil reason and natural reason, of both the mind and the soul of the judge.  On the one 
hand, equity required careful examination of the concrete circumstances of the 
particular case, enabling the judge properly to apply the general rule to those particular 
circumstances.  It included earnest study, analysis, and comparison of comparable 
cases and legal authorities, as any good jurist and judge is trained to do.  This was an 
exercise of civil reason, which was essential to every legal judgment.  On the other 
hand, equity also required what Oldendorp called “a judgment of the soul” (iudicium 
animi).135  It required consultation and application of the natural law of conscience, the 
God-given law inside people.136  This was effectively an exercise of natural reason, 
which was essential to making every judgment of law (Rechtsentscheidung) a judgment 
of conscience (Gewissensentscheidung) as well.   
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To retrieve equity from one’s conscience and to ensure that one's judgment was 
an exercise of both reason and conscience, Oldendorp argued, required a combination 
of refined professional craftmanship and simple Christian piety.137  “A judgment cannot 
be made in conscience,” Oldendorp wrote, “without some formula of law which indicates 
in the heart of man that what he does is just or unjust.  Therefore, law, that is, the law of 
Holy Scripture, is in the person.”138  In order to discern what is equitable, the individual 
jurist, having exercised his or her legally-trained civil reason to the maximum degree, 
must then study the Bible, pray to God, and search his or her conscience for instruction.  
This pious method was to be used not only for the hard case-–whether to execute a 
felon convicted for a capital crime on slender evidence or to separate a young child 
dependent on its loving mother in a case of disputed custody.  This method was to be 
used in every legal case, since every case required the equitable application of a rule.  
In some cases, this equitable method would yield a strict application of the rule.  In other 
cases, it would compel the judge to suspend a legal rule, to interpret it favorably 
towards one of the parties, to give special solicitude to a civil litigant or criminal 
defendant who was poor, orphaned, widowed, or abused, or to reform and improve the 
rule and thus to create a basis for its future equitable application in a comparable case.  
When applied in the courtroom, Oldendorp’s theory of equity was a unique form of 
Christian practical reasoning, on the one hand, and pious judicial activism, on the other.  
Oldendorp’s theory of equity built squarely on Luther’s belief in the Christian 
conscience as the ultimate source of moral decisions.  Luther had justified his own 
defiance of Emperor Charles V at the Diet of Worms in 1521 as acts “for God and in my 
conscience.”  As he reputedly put it: “I am bound by the scriptures, ... and my 
conscience is captive to the Word of God.  I cannot and will not retract anything, since it 
is neither safe nor right to go against conscience.  I cannot do otherwise, here I stand, 
may God help me, Amen.”139  In his later writings, Luther had also urged every 
magistrate not only to “have the law as firmly in hand as the sword,” but also, Solomon-
like, to “cling solely to God, and to be at him constantly, praying for a right 
understanding [of the law] beyond that of all the law books and teachers, to rule his 
subjects.”  With such an attitude, “God will certainly accord him the ability to implement 
all laws, counsels, and actions in a proper and godly way.”140  
Oldendorp developed Luther’s emphasis on a biblically- and prayerfully-informed 
conscience into a constituent element of his theory of law and equity.  Every legal 
decision, for Oldendorp, was ultimately a moral decision.  Every such decision, 
therefore, required consultation of conscience, and conscientious invocation of 
Scripture, prayer, and reflection.  While such consultation of conscience was a general 
duty for every law-abiding citizen, it was a special duty for the judge in the interpretation 
and application of legal rules.  Just as Luther, a learned theologian of the church, could 
ultimately break a positive law of the church hat violated conscience, so the judge, a 
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learned counselor of the state, could ultimately waive a positive law of the state that 
trespassed these same transcendent norms. 
Oldendorp also built on the traditional teaching that the Church’s canon law was 
the "the mother of exceptions," "the epitome of the law of love," and "the mother of 
justice."  These equitable qualities had traditionally rendered the canon laws applied in 
the Church courts an attractive alternative to the civil laws applied in secular courts.141  
Oldendorp’s theory sought to render these equitable qualities endemic to all laws and to 
all courts in a Christian commonwealth.  Law and equity, he believed, were 
fundamentally conjoined, whatever the source of the law, and whatever the forum for its 
implementation.  It was the duty of the Christian legislator to promulgate civil laws 
consistent with the moral teachings of divine law and natural law.  It was the duty of the 
Christian judge to interpret these laws with the equitable methods of both civil and 
natural reason.   
Traditionally, equity was considered to be a unique quality of the canon law and a 
unique ability of the ecclesiastical judge.  Thus in medieval Germany cases that 
required formal equity were removed to the church courts for resolution.  Likewise in 
medieval England, equity was administered in the court of the Chancellor, staffed by a 
ranking ecclesiastic trained in the canon law.  Oldendorp’s theory effectively merged law 
and equity.  All law required equity to be just, and all equity required law to be applied 
justly.  Law and equity belonged together and completed each other.  It was the general 
responsibility of the legislator to “build equity into the law,” in passing new laws.  But it 
was the special calling of every judge to do equity in every case.  Oldendorp’s theory 
had direct implications for legal reform in Lutheran Germany.  It helped to support the 
merger of church courts and state courts; separate courts of equity were no longer 
required.  It helped to support the convergence of canon law and civil law in Evangelical 
Germany.  And it helped to support the growing professionalization of the German 
judiciary in the sixteenth century, and the requirement that judges be educated both in 
law and in theology, in civil law and in canon law.142   
Summary and Conclusions 
The foregoing pages have sought to take the measure of the emerging theories 
of natural law of Philip Melanchthon, the great moralist of the University of Wittenberg, 
and Johann Oldendorp, a distinguished and prolific jurist, at the other early capital of 
Lutheran learning, the University of Marburg.  There were dozens of other Lutheran 
moralists and jurists in the first half of the sixteenth century who wrote on law, politics, 
and society.  Sometimes their views echoed those of Melanchthon or Oldendorp.  
Sometimes, they hewed more closely to the traditional teachings of medieval canonists 
and civilians.  The Lutheran Reformation did not produce a single or uniform 
jurisprudence.  But it did produce a series of direct and dramatic legal applications of 
several cardinal teachings of Lutheran theology.  
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Melanchthon and Oldendorp both began their theories with a basic 
understanding of Luther’s two-kingdoms framework.  More than Luther, however, they 
empahsized that the Bible was an essential source of earthly law.  Luther was all for 
using the Bible to guide life in the earthly kingdom.  But he touched only intermittently 
and ambivalently on the Gospel’s precise legal role within the state.  He tended to use 
the Bible as a convenient trope and trump in arguing for certain legal reforms, without 
spelling out a systematic theological jurisprudence.  Melanchthon and Oldendorp 
viewed the Bible as the highest source of law for life in the earthly kingdom.  For them, it 
was the fullest statement of the divine law.  It contained the best summary of the natural 
law.  It provided the surest guide for positive law.  With human reason distorted by sin, 
the jurists argued, faith in the Gospel was essential to rational apprehension and 
application of law in the earthly kingdom.  The Gospel was the best fuel to bring to light 
and life what the jurists called the “inborn sparks” of natural knowledge of good and evil 
that God has allowed us to retain in our reason and conscience despite the fall into sin. 
With Luther, Melanchthon and Oldendorp laid special emphasis on the Ten 
Commandments.  The First Table of the Ten Commandments, they believed, laid out 
the cardinal principles of spiritual law and morality that governed the relationship 
between persons and God.  The Second Table laid out the cardinal principles of civil 
law and morality that governed the basic relationships among persons.  This division of 
principles was useful not only for preaching, catechesis, and theological ethics, as 
Luther and the theologians had argued.  For the jurists, the Ten Commandments also 
proved useful to systematizing the positive law of the earthly kingdom.  The First Table 
undergirded the positive laws of religious establishment and ecclesiastical order.  The 
Second Table undergirded the positive laws governing crime, property, family, civil 
procedure, evidence, and more.   
Both Melanchthon and Oldendorp emphasized the three uses of law in the 
governance of the earthly kingdom.  Luther had developed the uses of the law doctrine 
as part of his theology of salvation, and part of his answer to the antinomians.  Legal 
works played no role in the drama of salvation.  Yet, the law itself was useful in the 
earthly kingdom to restrain sin and to drive sinners to the repentance that was 
necessary for faith in Christ and thus entrance into the heavenly kingdom.  Melanchthon 
and Oldendorp concurred in this understanding of the civil use and the theological use 
of law.  But, they also emphasized the educational use of the law in the earthly 
kingdom.  When properly understood and applied, the law not only coerced sinners, it 
also educated saints.  It yielded not only a basic civil morality, but also a higher spiritual 
morality.  This was a further argument that the jurists used to insist on positive laws that 
established religious doctrine, liturgy, and morality in each polity.  The positive law was 
to teach not only the civil morality of the Second Table of the Decalogue, but also the 
spiritual morality of the First Table.  It was to teach citizens not only the letter of the 
moral law, but also its spirit.  The law thereby was useful in defining and enforcing not 
only a “morality of duty” but also a “morality of aspiration.”143 
 
143 These terms are from Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven, CT, 1964). 
Melanchthon applied the three uses of the law to differentiate and define the 
three purposes of criminal law and punishment.  In his view, the civil use of the law 
corresponded to criminal deterrence.  The theological use of the law corresponded to 
criminal retribution.  The educational use of the law corresponded to criminal 
rehabilitation.  This argument had obvious implications for the exercise of ecclesiastical 
and parental discipline as well.  Indeed, political, ecclesiastical, and parental authority 
alike had to be exercised with an eye to balancing the civil, theological, and educational 
uses of the law.  More specifically, the prince, the preacher, and the paterfamilias had to 
strive to balance the concurrent concerns for deterrence, retribution, and reformation of 
their subjects.  
Oldendorp applied this uses doctrine in part to develop his theory of Christian 
equity.  The task of the Christian judge was not only to apply the letter of the law using 
the tools of civil legal reasoning.  It was also to apply the spirit of the law, using the tools 
of prayer, conscientious meditation, and reading of Scripture.  Civil legal reasoning 
would only yield a civil understanding and application of positive law.  Spiritual legal 
reasoning would yield a higher spiritual understanding and application.  Oldendorp did 
not put his theory of Christian equity in quite these terms.  But his theory depended 
upon a distinction that was central to the uses doctrine, that between a lower civil use 
and a higher spiritual use of the law.  
In a 1531 oration at the University of Wittenberg, Philip Melanchthon declared: “It 
is impossible to uphold civil discipline without religion, and jurisprudence is shaped most 
by religious doctrine.”  Indeed, only when “religion adds its voice to civil precepts,” does 
law have the authority to govern and the power to reform.144  These early sentiments 
were the watchwords of sixteenth-century Lutheran jurisprudence.  For the early 
Evangelical jurists, law and Gospel, justice and mercy, rule and equity, discipline and 
love, order and faith, structure and spirit all properly belonged in the governance of the 
earthly kingdom.  To separate one dimension from the other was to serve the Devil and 
to get a foretaste of hell.  To hold them in tension was to serve the Divine and to see a 
glimmer of heaven.  
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